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JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE CRIMINAL LAW* 
Moderator: Justice David Stras** 
Panelists: Orin Kerr,‡ Rachel Barkow,‡‡ Stephanos Bibas,± Paul J. Larkin, 
Jr.±± 
JUSTICE DAVID STRAS (MODERATOR): Justice Scalia’s criminal law and 
procedure jurisprudence is fascinating. Justice Scalia didn’t always end 
up where I thought he would end up and, I think, where a lot of people 
thought he would end up in some of the cases he decided. But I think there 
is a consistent theme in his jurisprudence in a number of different areas 
in criminal law. Let me talk a little bit about what we’re going to do here. 
Each panelist is going to have a few minutes to talk about each of the 
subjects they want to talk about. Then I may ask a question or two of each 
of the panelists, or open it up to the audience, depending on where the 
discussion goes. So, without further ado, let’s get started. 
Our first speaker is Professor Orin Kerr, who is a nationally recognized 
scholar in criminal procedure and computer crime law. He’s also a 
frequent contributor to The Volokh Conspiracy. Among his other 
accomplishments, he was a trial attorney at the U.S. Department of 
Justice, as well as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District 
of Virginia. He also clerked for Justice Anthony Kennedy on the United 
States Supreme Court and is considered a national expert on Fourth 
Amendment law, and is especially proficient at the intersection of the 
Fourth Amendment and technology. Without further ado, Professor Kerr. 
 
PROFESSOR ORIN KERR: Thank you so much, Dave, and to the 
Federalist Society for the invitation. I’ve been a long-time participant in 
Federalist Society national conventions and never spoken. I feel like the 
person who calls into the radio program and says “long-time listener, first-
time caller.” Hopefully, the call will go OK. 
I'm going to talk about Justice Scalia's impact on the Fourth 
 
* Panel discussion held at the 2016 Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention. Panelists’ remarks 
have been lightly edited for clarity. 
** Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, J.D., University of Kansas Law School. 
At the time of the panel, Judge Stras was an Associate Justice on the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
‡ Frances R. and John J. Duggan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Southern California Gould 
School of Law. 
‡‡ Segal Family Professor of Regulatory Law and Policy, New York University School of Law, J.D., 
Harvard Law School. 
± Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, J.D., Yale Law School. At the time of the 
panel, Judge Bibas was a Professor of Law and Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania Law School 
and Director of Penn Law’s Supreme Court Clinic. 
±± Senior Legal Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation, Meese Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, 
Institute for Constitutional Government, J.D., Stanford Law School. 
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Amendment, the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Justice Scalia had a significant impact on this body of law that has been, 
in part, overlooked.  I want to tease out Justice Scalia’s particular vision 
of the Fourth Amendment and talk about what it did and what it didn’t 
quite do. My view is that he had a significant impact on the doctrine, but 
that it was also more a matter of form than substance. 
I should start by saying that Justice Scalia was not really a fan of the 
Fourth Amendment. He was interviewed on C-SPAN a few years ago, 
and he was talking about how Chief Justice Rehnquist would assign 
opinions and how Chief Justice Rehnquist loved to write Fourth 
Amendment cases. Justice Scalia said he did not actually like to write 
Fourth Amendment cases. He said, “I just hate Fourth Amendment cases. 
It’s almost a jury question, you know, whether this variation is an 
unreasonable search or seizure. It’s variation 3,542. Yes, I’ll write the 
opinion, but I don’t consider it a plum.”1 Now, that hurts, as someone who 
spends a lot of time working in the area of Fourth Amendment law. To 
each his own, I suppose.  
But Justice Scalia actually did have a significant impact on the body of 
law, despite not being a big fan of the Fourth Amendment. He had a vision 
in which he pursued his two broad themes in his constitutional 
jurisprudence.  One being originalism, pursuing the original public 
meaning of the Constitution.  And the other limiting judicial discretion, 
rules instead of standards.  And, of course, those worked together. If you 
have to follow the original public meaning, then that will cabin the 
discretion of judges.  
Justice Scalia pursued this in the following way. He looked at Fourth 
Amendment doctrine as he came to the Court in the 1980s and saw a body 
of judge-made law that invested judges with a great deal of judicial 
discretion. A good example of this is the Katz2 reasonable expectation of 
privacy test, which governs what is a search. In 1998, in Minnesota v. 
Carter, Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion condemning the 
doctrine. He said it’s a “self-indulgent test.” “[I]t has no plausible 
foundation in the text of the Fourth Amendment.”3 He wrote that the 
Fourth Amendment 
 
did not guarantee some generalized “right to privacy” and leave it to 
this Court to determine which particular manifestations of the value 
 
           1.  Interview by Susan Swain with Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court, in Washington, D.C. (June 19, 2009), available at http://supremecourt.c-span.org/ 
assets/pdf/AScalia.pdf. 
           2.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).   
           3.  Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998). 
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of privacy “society has prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”4 
 
If society wants to make that judgment, they should do so with the elected 
branches, not with the courts. Scalia disagreed with the Katz test as 
infusing too much discretion in judges, and he had a similar view of 
constitutional reasonableness. Once the Fourth Amendment recognizes 
conduct as a search or a seizure, the courts have to say what’s reasonable. 
He objected to the judges-make-up-what’s-reasonable-based-on-their-
sense-at-the-time approach that he had seen in some earlier cases.  
 So, what did he do about it? What’s his vision of the Fourth 
Amendment? Justice Scalia basically divided the world into the old and 
the new, and he tried to carve out the old, original Fourth Amendment and 
distinguish it from the newly developed Fourth Amendment in the 
following way.  
 First, consider the test for what is a search. In United States v. Jones,5 
Justice Scalia, in a five-justice majority opinion held that the test for what 
is a search actually has two components. There is, first, what is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy (the Katz test), but there is also a 
physical intrusion or trespass test. If government conduct is a trespass, it 
counts as a Fourth Amendment search, regardless of whether there was a 
violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
 The idea was to make what had been understood to be the single test, 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test, into different tests – “old” 
trespass, “new” reasonable expectation of privacy. This was a curiosity to 
Fourth Amendment scholars. There were a lot of people who had to 
rewrite treatises and case books and commercial outlines because 
everybody had understood the Katz test to be the only test in town. Not 
so after Jones. There’s a division between these two different tests, 
trespass and reasonable expectation of privacy. So, that’s one change 
which was really driven by Justice Scalia in his majority opinion in Jones. 
 The other change was to alter the test for Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness. Instead of it being a free-form inquiry – where judges 
determine, in context, what’s reasonable – you look to see whether it’s an 
old problem that was answered at common law. This is what Justice Scalia 
wrote in Arizona v. Gant, in his concurring opinion. “To determine what 
is an ‘unreasonable’ search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
we look first to the historical practices the Framers sought to preserve; if 
those provide inadequate guidance, we apply traditional standards of 
reasonableness.”6 That is, judge-made standards. As he put the same point 
a few years earlier in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, we look for 
 
 4. Id. at 97. 
 5. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 6. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009). 
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a “clear practice either approving or disapproving the type of search at 
issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted.”7 So, what 
does that mean? It means, when trying to figure out what searches are 
constitutionally reasonable, you look to whether there was a common-law 
answer. There were common-law rules of search and seizure, and if there 
is a clear answer to that specific practice, you follow the common-law 
rule. On the other hand, if there is no clear answer, or if it’s a new set of 
facts (if it’s something, say, involving technology or cars or something 
which just didn’t exist at common law), then you can apply a more general 
reasonableness approach.  
 These are some pretty significant changes. They divide the Fourth 
Amendment world doctrinally into the old and the new. I think of them as 
plausibly originalist approaches to the Fourth Amendment. I say 
“plausibly originalist” because, well, it’s not clear that this was a serious 
originalist approach. It’s not obvious that trespass was the test or that the 
original understanding of what is “search” was based on trespass. Rather, 
we know that the cases that inspired the passage of the Fourth 
Amendment, Entick v. Carrington8 from 1765, prominently involved civil 
claims alleging trespass, and so what was a “trespass” was relevant to 
establish the cause of action. In that context, the common-law search-and-
seizure rules were an affirmative defense to the trespass action. It’s not 
obvious that means that “trespass” is actually the original public 
understanding of “search.” But it’s at least a plausible, historical way of 
rooting Fourth Amendment doctrine in some sort of objective test, or at 
least something that cabins the discretion of judges.  
 I always wondered what Justice Scalia wanted to do with this 
bifurcation, this dividing of the doctrine, as he did. There’s always a 
possibility that maybe he was trying to cut off the trespass parts of Katz 
with the hope being someday that he could kill Katz, that he could cut off 
that newfound part.  Because just dividing the doctrine into two, on its 
own, doesn’t really make an obvious difference. It just determines which 
doctrinal box you're going into. Of course, we’ll never know where 
Justice Scalia was going. And, at least as the cases came down at the time 
of his death, it’s not obvious that these changes had a big impact in terms 
of actual outcomes. 
 As I suggested, dividing the law of searches into trespass searches and 
reasonable expectation of privacy searches may just be moving doctrinal 
boxes around. The Court had indicated in a footnote in Rakas v. Illinois9 
that if there is a trespass, then there’s going to be a violation of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. So you could have just kept it all under 
 
 7. Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995). 
 8. 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (CP 1765).  
 9. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).  
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the reasonable expectation of privacy rubric without specifically dividing 
out trespass. It’s not obvious that anything is gained in terms of outcomes 
by dividing it. Although doctrinally, as a matter of black-letter law, it 
makes a pretty significant difference. 
 I think you can say more about the impact of the switch to 
reasonableness in that it can actually cabin the discretion of judges. If 
judges have to stick to the common-law rule to the extent it’s an old 
practice in a clear common-law answer, that’s what the Court should 
follow. That’s pretty different from the law before Justice Scalia joined 
the Court. For example, in Payton v. New York10 in the early 1980s, the 
Court rejected the common-law rule for whether a warrant was required 
to enter a house to arrest someone. The common-law rule is that no 
warrant was required. The Court said a warrant was required, and it was 
based on policy grounds – “Well, it doesn’t really work to say there’s a 
warrant required” – and it was more of a free-floating reasonableness 
idea. At least under Justice Scalia’s methodology, that would not 
presumably have been the approach the Court took because there was a 
clear common-law answer.  And it was a set of facts that were clear at 
common law. 
 With that said, it’s also not obvious that the methodology of looking to 
common law first is actually going to cabin judges all that much. It’s 
pretty easy to say, “I look at the common law, and I don’t see a clear 
answer,” or “I think this set of facts is a new set of facts.” It’s always easy 
to say, “Well, the world has changed, therefore, the old common-law 
answer doesn’t apply.” We haven’t really seen cases where the courts say, 
“We wish we could go in a different direction, but we’re cabined by this 
framework.”  
 It’s also a little early to say this framework is established in the cases 
in the sense that, if a court doesn’t follow it, they look odd. That 
framework has been followed recently, for example, in the Birchfield v. 
North Dakota.11 In an opinion by Justice Alito, the Court said that testing 
for blood and breath for a DUI arrest is a new set of problems, so we just 
look to general reasonableness. We haven’t seen the cases where there is 
a real tension there, where the judges or justices divide. But it’s possible 
that Scalia’s old/new methodology will cabin the discretion of judges in 
a significant way.   
 Certainly, for a body of law that Justice Scalia himself said he didn’t 
like, he had a significant impact beyond his votes in changing the black-
letter law.  At least on its surface, the law is now saying, “Listen, there’s 
an understanding of what the Fourth Amendment means; it is the original 
 
 10. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).  
           11.   136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016). 
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understanding of what the Fourth Amendment means. That is a rock-solid 
piece of the doctrine; the judges can monkey around with the other parts, 
but they have to keep that initial part preserved.” I think that’s a pretty 
significant accomplishment for a justice.  
 Thank you for listening. I look forward to the rest of the panel. 
 
JUSTICE STRAS (MODERATOR): Thank you, Professor Kerr. Our next 
panelist is Professor Rachel Barkow, who is the Segal Family Professor 
of Regulatory Law and Policy and the Faculty Director of the Center on 
the Administration of Criminal Law at New York University Law School. 
She’s also a member of the United States Sentencing Commission. She 
teaches courses in criminal law, administrative law, and constitutional 
law. She also clerked for Justice Scalia, so she will have unique insights 
on our topic today, and her scholarship, as her resume would suggest, 
focuses on criminal law and especially the intersections of administrative 
law, constitutional law, and, obviously, criminal law. So, without further 
ado, I will pass it over to Professor Barkow. 
 
PROFESSOR RACHEL BARKOW: Thank you very much, Judge. I’m glad 
we’re doing a panel on criminal law today in large measure because I 
think this is one of the areas where you really see Justice Scalia’s 
commitment to law, regardless of what the outcome is in a particular case. 
I think you really get a sense of non-ideological voting here, which I think 
is very commendable in a judge. There are lots of things we could be 
talking about, and it was hard for me to pick one, but today I want to talk 
about the ways in which Justice Scalia’s commitment to textualism 
benefited criminal defendants, and I’m going to focus on two areas. The 
first is how textualism affected his approach to vagueness challenges, and 
then, second, how he interpreted the statutes more generally and why a 
commitment to textualism is more likely – though not always – but more 
likely going to benefit criminal defense than a statutory approach that 
looks at a statute’s broader purpose or looks at legislative history.  
First, to start with the vagueness cases. For years, Justice Scalia had 
been lamenting that there were circuit splits and a lot of confusion of a 
law called the Armed Career Criminal Act, or ACCA, as it is known. 
Under ACCA, if you are a felon in possession of a firearm, you get a 
fifteen-year mandatory minimum, and you can get up to a life sentence if 
you have three prior convictions for serious drug offenses or violent 
felonies. So, the key to the law is: What are the violent felonies that trigger 
this mandatory minimum and get you within its scope? The way that the 
act defines these has a list of some, so those are the enumerated felonies, 
and then it explains that, even if a felony is not one of the ones that is 
listed and enumerated, you could still be held, pursuant to ACCA and 
6
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qualified for it, as long as the felony is violent, if it involves the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, or (and this is the key 
part of the statute that drew Justice Scalia’s ire) if it “otherwise involves 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.”12  
That last part of the law is known as the residual clause in ACCA, and 
for years Justice Scalia had been saying, “This is unconstitutionally 
vague; no one knows what this means.” He first mentioned it in a dissent 
in a 2007 case, James v. United States,13 and at that point he just had 
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Stevens along for the ride. But if you know 
Justice Scalia, or you followed him, he was not one to give up easily, so 
he repeatedly called out problems with this law whenever he had the 
opportunity. He dissented again in 2011 in a case called Sykes, and this 
time he also got Justice Kagan to join his dissent. She had since joined 
the Court and agreed with him. Eventually, in 2015, he got seven justices 
to agree with him. One, it’s an interesting, substantive way to look at it, 
but it also shows that, over time, the justice did get other justices to see 
his point of view on things, which sometimes gets overlooked, I think.  
In Johnson v. United States, Justice Scalia noted in his opinion that his 
statute was, in fact, unconstitutionally vague because the wording of the 
statute “leaves grave uncertainty” about how much risk it takes for a crime 
to qualify as a violent felony.14 In April of this year, after Justice Scalia 
passed away, the Court ultimately decided that Johnson, the decision 
holding this clause to be constitutionally vague, applies retroactively. And 
there are thousands of petitions pending in the courts for people seeking 
to have their sentences reduced as a result.  
Now, I think it’s safe to say that the people who are getting ACCA 
relief aren’t exactly the preferred constituency of Justice Scalia. The 
people who get these Johnson motions are not people with three prior 
drug offenses that fall within the fifteen-year mandatory minimum. These 
people, by definition, have to have a felony that was thought to have been 
violent, and if you look at Johnson himself, I think you’ll see that these 
are not always the most sympathetic figures. Johnson was a white 
supremacist who the F.B.I. had been monitoring because they were 
concerned he was going to commit a terrorist act. In the words of Justice 
Alito, Johnson “led a life of crime and violence” and had prior convictions 
for “robbery, attempted robbery, illegal possession of a sawed-off 
shotgun, and a drug offense.”15 So, it wasn’t, I don’t think, that Justice 
Scalia was particularly moved by Mr. Johnson’s predicament. He was 
 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  
 13. 550 U.S. 192 (2007). 
 14. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015). 
 15. Id. at 2574 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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interested in a broader legal principle. That commitment to the broader 
legal principle transcended whatever the facts were of the particular case, 
and he stuck with it. He noted in particular, when he dissented in Sykes, 
what it was that vagueness doctrine is supposed to be about and what 
concerned him, and I think it’s worth paying attention to this because of 
his commitment. He said, 
 
We face a Congress that puts forth an ever-increasing volume of 
laws in general, and of criminal laws in particular. It should be no 
surprise that as the volume increases, so do the number of imprecise 
laws. And no surprise that our indulgence of imprecisions that 
violate the Constitution encourages imprecisions that violate the 
Constitution. Fuzzy, leave-the-details-to-be-sorted-out-by-the-
courts legislation is attractive to the Congressman who wants credit 
for addressing a national problem but does not have the time (or 
perhaps the votes) to grapple with the nitty-gritty. In the field of 
criminal law, at least, it is time to call a halt. I do not think it would 
be a radical step – indeed, I think it would be highly responsible – 
to limit ACCA to the named violent crimes. Congress can quickly 
add what it wishes.16 
 
 I think it’s really important. Justice Scalia meant what he said. 
“Congress, you want a list of felonies? Put them in there. But if you are 
going to just pass vague laws, the Constitution will not allow you to take 
somebody’s liberty away on that basis, no matter how the particular facts 
of a case may look, or how unsympathetic that person may be.” It wasn’t 
the first time that Justice Scalia ruled a statute had been void for 
vagueness. He did the same thing in Skilling v. United States, where he 
found the honest services theory of mail and wire fraud to be void for 
vagueness. There the majority saved the statute, or tried to save the 
statute, by interpreting it to say, “Well, it’s not just ‘honest services,’ fine, 
we’ll say it’s limited to bribes and kickbacks,” but Justice Scalia refused 
to sign off to that because, in his view, he said a statute could not be saved 
by “judicial construction that writes in specific criteria that its text does 
not contain.”17 And then he concluded his concurrence there with a quote 
from Justice Waite that it would be “dangerous if the legislature could set 
a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts 
to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained and who should 
be set at large.”18  
 In these vagueness cases, you see Justice Scalia guided by his view that 
 
 16. Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 35 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 17. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 416 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 18. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875). 
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the statute has to be clear on its face if you’re going to hold somebody 
criminally responsible for violating its terms, and you can’t just have the 
courts fix things later. It’s got to be clearer from the outset. And you’ll 
see this same theme in the second area that I wanted to emphasize, which 
is his interpretation of criminal statutes, even when there’s not a 
constitutional vagueness issue – just run-of-the-mill “What does the 
statute mean?” Here, his commitment to textualism meant that he read 
statutes to reach no further than what they said, and if they weren’t clear 
on his face, his commitment to the rule of lenity meant that they were 
interpreted in favor of criminal defendants. He explained this in United 
States v. Santos, where he said that the rule of lenity “places the weight 
of inertia upon the party [the government] that can best introduce 
Congress to speak more clearly.”19 He had a very clear framework of how 
our government is supposed to work when it comes to criminal law. You 
need to get Congress to specifically say what it is that you cannot do 
before someone can be criminally punished, and if there is any ambiguity, 
that goes in favor of the criminal defendant, and if the government doesn’t 
like that outcome, as he pointed out, the government is in the best position 
to go ask Congress to fix it. It would be much harder for a criminal 
defendant to do that, had the government won those ties, or in those 
ambiguous contexts.  
 Now, justices who use legislative history to interpret statutes often 
disagreed with Justice Scalia in cases, and they would rule for the 
government because they thought the legislative history would clear 
things up. You could look at it, and you could figure out what the broader 
purpose was. But Justice Scalia always required more of our government 
before he allowed it to interfere with individual liberty. If you wanted to 
criminally punish somebody, you had to get clear language passed by both 
the House and the Senate, and signed by the President. You see this 
throughout his approach to statutory interpretation, whether it’s 
administrative law or it’s criminal law, and I think it’s important to note 
that he was just adamant that this was what liberty required. It has to go 
through bicameralism and presentment, and the language has to be clear. 
So, while we have some justices on the Court who I know favor a more 
active government role, Justice Scalia always demanded more before 
someone’s individual liberty could be taken away, and, in my view, our 
constitutional order is far greater because of it. 
 
JUSTICE STRAS (MODERATOR): Thank you, Professor Barkow. Our next 
speaker is Professor Stephanos Bibas, who teaches at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School. He studies the powers and incentives that 
 
 19. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008). 
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shape how prosecutors, defense counsel, defendants, and judges behave 
in the real world. He also studies the divorce between criminal procedures 
focused on efficiency and criminal law’s interest in healing victims, 
defendants, and communities. In addition to having served as a clerk for 
Justice Kennedy, he’s the Director of Penn’s Supreme Court Clinic, 
where he and his students have litigated a wide variety of cases, but one 
notable one is Padilla v. Kentucky,20 which has caused certainly a lot of 
work for a lot of state courts and other federal courts. It’s a big case 
involving the right to counsel for noncitizen criminal defendants. As a 
personal note, I would like to thank a colleague of mine who is the head 
of the Minnesota Sentencing Commission. I had some issues with 
sentencing, and Professor Bibas was kind enough to help my colleague 
out. So, as a matter of personal privilege, I just want to extend my thanks 
and turn it over to him. 
 
PROFESSOR STEPHANOS BIBAS: Thank you, Justice Stras. This is a 
distinguished panel I’m honored to be included in. In many ways, my 
comments are going to parallel, or pick up on, those you just heard from 
my dear friend, Rachel Barkow. I’m going to talk about the Sixth 
Amendment and try to draw together threads from three different clauses 
of the Sixth Amendment. There’s the Confrontation Clause, where Justice 
Scalia spearheaded the Crawford21 line of cases, which said that if you 
want to bring in testimony from a witness, you need that witness 
physically present in open court to be cross-examined. There’s the jury 
trial guarantee—in the Apprendi/Blakely line of cases, he spearheaded 
recognizing that if a fact raises the maximum statutory or guidelines 
sentence, it has to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. And 
then there’s the Assistance of Counsel Clause, where Justice Scalia has 
been in dissent in Padilla, Lafler, and Frye.22 There, the majority 
extended the reach of the Assistance of Counsel Clause to plea bargaining 
and guilty pleas, , and Justice Scalia has resisted.  
First, I’m going to talk about his methodology, then I’m going to talk 
about the importance of clarity, and then I’ll finish up with a discussion 
about separation of powers. First of all, in terms of methodology, the first 
point I want to stress is that he had one. It’s hard for us to think back, but 
a certain generation of lawyers can remember back when litigating these 
cases was an anything-goes endeavor, whatever you can throw in. There 
were cases in other areas where, if we look at the legislative history and 
it’s unclear, then we turn to the text. There wasn’t a clear way in which 
one approached these cases. There wasn’t a clear vocabulary because 
 
 20. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 21. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
           22.   Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012). 
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there wasn’t a clear point to the judicial exercise. It is very important that 
Justice Scalia changed the terms of the debate. There is now a vocabulary 
that the Crawford line of cases focuses on. The clause speaks of anyone 
who is brought to be a witness, or someone who gives testimony in a case. 
That includes certain people who are trying to become declarants to 
inculpate somebody, and then it excludes some other things, which may 
be technically under the rules of hearsay. But the rules of hearsay got 
confused with what the Confrontation Clause itself governs.  
The jury trial guarantee is another place where there was no clear focus. 
What is an element of a crime that has to be proved to a jury? What is a 
sentencing factor? Justice Scalia, very importantly, focused on the 
importance of preserving the jury’s role, defining the jury’s role, and 
understanding what the jury’s role is in contradistinction to judges and 
prosecutors. Now these cases are just litigated very differently. Win or 
lose, one had to grapple with his terms and his engagement with the very 
specifics of these clauses, as well as their structural role and their 
historical purpose and context.  
I do want to stress that, as Professor Barkow mentioned, this approach 
and methodology is grounded in law. There is law here. There are tests. 
One has to be a textualist, and his originalism is a public meaning, 
objective originalism, grounded in the text. It’s not just politics. Now, 
again, that might seem obvious with the benefit of hindsight, but take a 
look at the Confrontation Clause. Before Crawford in 2004, there was a 
generation of lawyers who had to learn Ohio v. Roberts.23 From 1980 to 
2003 or 2004, you had to argue about whether testimony was hearsay; the 
Confrontation Clause supposedly has a preference for live testimony; the 
preference is not absolute; and we can allow things if the hearsay is 
grounded in a firmly rooted hearsay exception, or bears particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness. So, you had a seven-factor, eight-factor, 
nine-factor balancing test – it was completely unpredictable. The 
Crawford opinion itself catalogued a number of lower-court cases which 
held, “Well, if the hearsay is very recent, then it sounds like it’s an excited 
utterance and we ought to let in because it wasn’t fabricated. If the hearsay 
is very old, it has longstanding guarantees of authenticity – let’s let it in.” 
There was really no check. “Heads, I win; tails, you lose. We don’t want 
to let this criminal defendant off; we don’t want to let that criminal 
defendant off.” So, the clause came to be kind of meaningless. 
The same could be argued about the jury-trial guarantees: How much 
is too much discretion for the judge at sentencing? The result was wide 
open sentencing discretion – surely there’s something the legislature can’t 
hand off from the jury to the judge. There is a grounding in law, in text, 
 
 23. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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in roles of actors that Justice Scalia brought, and a rigor that was missing 
from these debates until his bracing take on them was brought to bear.  
By the way, it’s also worth noting that, as Professor Barkow 
mentioned, his methodology created odd bedfellows. It constantly irks me 
that newspaper reporters want to paint the Supreme Court in a left-versus-
right divide, and one of the things to Justice Scalia’s great credit is he 
constrained his own political preferences. He ruled in favor of a lot of 
people, and he candidly said, “I don’t like these people!” Ralph Blakely 
is someone who kidnapped his wife and confined her in a coffin-like box 
in the back of his truck. There were a lot of unsympathetic characters. The 
flag-burning case24 is another example outside of criminal law where he 
was very clear about saying, “I don’t like this personally, but this is where 
consistent, principled methodology takes us.” That made him very 
different from some other possibly more results-oriented justices, and it’s 
important to underscoring that judging is about the rule of law, not 
politics.  
My second point is one of clarity. In the Fourth Amendment, the text 
doesn’t necessarily generate formalism when it talks about 
reasonableness, but in the Sixth Amendment context, textualism brought 
out certain bright-line rules. I think he certainly liked bright-line rules, but 
they also served some of these rule-of-law values pretty well. One of his 
arguments was that it’s important to give people fair notice of what’s 
going to be admissible in court, what kinds of penalties a criminal 
defendant is going to face, and what a defendant is or is not entitled to as 
a matter of his defense lawyering.  And all this would protect against some 
maximum sentences but not against the possibility of losing out on 
leniency in the plea bargaining context. I personally view that as one of 
his less successful arguments because there’s a fiction that criminals 
actually know the prospective punishments when they burglarize. I don’t 
know that many criminal defendants who actually read the statute books.  
A better argument for clarity he advanced is that clarity is important to 
constrain the discretion of those in the system. His writing – his very 
trenchant and beautifully pointed writing – brought out this point. The 
best example I can think of is in the Apprendi line of cases. There was a 
case called McMillan v. Pennsylvania25 about thirty years ago. It said, 
“We think it’s good enough for government work if a judge triggers the 
mandatory minimum sentence, as long as the sentence enhancement 
doesn’t go so far as to allow the ‘tail to wag the dog.’” Now, Justice Scalia 
had great fun with the obvious subjectivity of this test. Because it was 
very murky, judges could always disagree about whether a particular 
 
            24.   Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 25. 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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enhancement went too far, and there was no way to falsify it. It was 
basically personal preferences. He had a footnote in which he wrote – in 
Blakely, I think – that he was terminating this line of jurisprudence 
because the “tail wags the dog” rule would   
 
require that the ratio of sentencing-factor add-on to basic criminal 
sentence be no greater than the ratio of caudal vertebrae to body in 
the breed of canine with the longest tail. Or perhaps no greater than 
the average such ratio for all breeds. Or perhaps the median. 
Regrettably, Apprendi has prevented full development of this line of 
jurisprudence.26  
 
He made reading footnotes fun because it’s obvious what the problem is 
with the “tail wags the dog”:  There’s no standard there; there’s no test. I 
know it when I see it, and surely we can do better in this area.  
A third importance of clarity that Professor Barkow alluded to is that 
Justice Scalia prized liberty over efficiency. There’s a real contrast 
between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer in this area. Justice Breyer, in 
his Apprendi dissent, pointed out, “You know, sentencing commissions 
make a lot of policy sense. They’re the wave of the future. They’re the 
experts. We ought to learn from them.”27 I have some sympathy myself 
for that policy position. Justice Scalia’s concurrence responded that 
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, has sketched out an admirably fair and 
efficient approach to criminal justice, but the Framers didn’t embrace that. 
They took a different tack. Our Constitution “has never been efficient; but 
it has always been free.”28 So, there’s a tradeoff. He embraced that 
tradeoff, and he grasped the nettle; but he saw a broader virtue in 
embracing this kind of clarity in protecting liberty, and not just pursuing 
efficiency and experiments that might muddy things.  
This brings me to my final point, which is the importance of the 
separation of powers in protecting juries and protecting liberty. Professor 
Barkow may be the leading scholar of the separation of powers in criminal 
procedure. I think the rule of lenity and vagueness are part of that, but 
another part of that is the way the Sixth Amendment plays out. First of 
all, he understood that about half of the Bill of Rights is criminal 
procedure, and it is a set of restrictions on government power. The 
government’s ability to punish people is an awesome power, and it has to 
be exercised vigorously to protect us. But it has to be restrained by checks, 
and these restraints are important to preserving liberty, as he kept 
underscoring. Secondly, he saw the importance of democracy as a 
 
 26. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 311 n. 13 (2004). 
            27.   See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 555-60 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 28. Id. at 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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counterweight to expertise, and the jury is the locus of democracy. 
Prosecutors – and I’m proud to be a former prosecutor – and judges are 
nevertheless functionaries of the state, and they have to satisfy a jury 
unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt that somebody deserves to be 
thrown in prison, to lose liberty, to have the stigma of a conviction. He 
powerfully wrote about the importance of juries seeing the witness be 
cross-examined to satisfy itself – not some judge deciding that hearsay is 
reliable, but the jury deciding for itself. The Constitution intends a 
procedure to ensure that the jury makes that determination, not a 
substantive requirement that the judge decides for himself or herself what 
is reliable. The Constitution guarantees that the jury authorizes a certain 
sentence, not that the judge decide what is enough proof. That separation 
of powers is an important part of our history, I would stress – the history 
of the colonists trying to check this authority.  
Now, I want to offer a note of caution at the end because I think a fair 
counterargument to Justice Scalia’s approach is that, while it works pretty 
well and is pretty faithful for problems from the 18th century, it might be 
arguably less workable in problems that are unpredictable and aren’t 
addressed by the text or the history. So, in the Fourth Amendment area – 
Professor Kerr has spoken about this – you’re aware there are big recent 
cases involving the use of GPS tracking to formulate a mosaic of a bunch 
of data,29 or cheek swabs to gather DNA,30 or thermal imaging.31 It’s at 
least strained to say that using thermal imaging devices is like watching 
snow melt in the 18th century. But in this area of the Sixth Amendment, I 
think there are real problems taking a Confrontation Clause that’s 
designed for live-witness testimony and applying it just hook-line-and-
sinker to forensic testimony.32 I think the Confrontation Clause works 
pretty well when you’re talking about lay witnesses and obvious 
incentives to fabricate. But when we’re talking about problems of DNA 
analysis and chains of custody, et cetera, it’s at least arguable that that 
might be an extension beyond where the text takes you. We ought to start 
there, but it’s not clear that it ends the analysis.  
The same thing when it comes to modern sentencing schemes. Again, 
a fair counterargument is insofar as we have historical parallels, it’s good 
to make sure the jury has some role but doesn’t necessarily preclude a 
scheme that might have more protections in it than indeterminate 
sentencing. Probably my biggest qualification in this area pertains to the 
plea-bargaining cases, the ones in which he was in dissent.33 Justice Scalia 
 
           29.   United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
           30.   Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013). 
           31.   Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
           32.   Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
            33.   Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 175 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
14
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss2/7
2018] JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 757 
and even Justice Thomas are unwilling to dynamite the plea bargaining 
edifice. There is a consistent originalist argument that plea bargaining 
does not fit with the Constitution. Go read Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution. “The trial of all criminal cases shall be by jury.” It looks like 
that was made to be a non-waivable structural check. If you do that, you 
have no plea bargaining – and no plea-bargaining problem. If you are 
going to have plea bargaining and you’re going to make the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of counsel meaningful in that world, you can take 
two approaches. You can take a formalist approach, which is Justice 
Scalia’s. He said, basically, if you are getting a discount in plea 
bargaining, you shouldn’t have any rights because it’s just unfettered 
leniency, and leniency doesn’t threaten these rule-of-law maximum-
sentence values. He said, “The Court today embraces the sporting-chance 
theory of criminal law, in which the State functions like a conscientious 
casino-operator, giving each player a fair chance to beat the house, that 
is, to serve less time than the law says he deserves.”34 From a formalist 
perspective, maybe. From a functionalist perspective, it’s not like a few 
people are getting a roulette wheel of leniency. Almost everybody is, and 
the real world is one in which most people are getting the going rate 
determined by plea bargaining, and Justice Scalia wasn’t going to take or 
extend Sixth Amendment protections to a world – nevertheless a post-
originalist world – that the Court was willing to allow.  
Those quibbles aside, there is no question that Justice Scalia has left a 
lasting legacy. His vocabulary and his methodology changed the terms of 
the debate and reinvigorated the Sixth Amendment, and that’s something 
that everybody has to grapple with. It’s telling that most of the justices on 
the Court have signed on to some of the unusual left-right coalitions 
involved here. Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter, Justice Stevens, now 
Justice Kagan and Justice Sotomayor have signed on to many of these 
opinions. So even non-committed originalists see the virtue in a method, 
in a purpose, in making these clauses mean something, even though they 
disagree about the details, and even though they sometimes get off the 
train with him at certain points. So his legacy endures, and it is an 
important testament to the rule of criminal law as a law of rules and not 
one of naked politics or discretion. 
 
JUSTICE STRAS (MODERATOR): Thank you, Professor. Our final speaker 
is Paul Larkin from the Heritage Foundation. He directs the Heritage 
Foundation’s project to counter abuse of the criminal law, particularly at 
the federal level, and he is part of the over-criminalization project of 
Heritage’s Rule of Law Initiative. Before joining Heritage in September 
 
 34. Id. at 186 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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of 2011, he held various positions with the federal government. He was 
at the U.S. Department of Justice from 1984 to 1993 as an assistant to the 
solicitor general and an attorney in the Criminal Division on organized 
crime and racketeering. He has argued twenty-seven cases before the U.S. 
Supreme Court. He was also a law clerk for the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, for Judge Robert Bork. I 
will turn it over to Mr. Larkin. 
 
MR. PAUL LARKIN: Thank you very much. I appreciate it, and it’s an 
honor to be here. I want to thank the Federalist Society for giving me this 
opportunity to be on a panel with three very brilliant professors.  
A few weeks ago, I was at a conference in Virginia, and the night 
before, I had dinner with some students and some of the other conference 
attendees, one of whom was Alan Morrison. I said to Alan that I think a 
good argument can be made that Justice Scalia was one of the best friends 
that defendants had when they came before him in his Court. Alan 
immediately interjected. “No, no, no, no. Look at all of his habeas 
jurisprudence. Nobody ever got any relief,” to which I said, “Alan, those 
are prisoners; they’re not defendants. By this point, they are already 
guilty, and an entirely different set of rules applies.”  
As my colleagues have mentioned, history is an important feature for 
Justice Scalia interpreting the substantive provisions of the Constitution, 
but it was also an important provision for him in some of the substantive 
criminal cases that he had. Now, his substantive criminal law 
jurisprudence was narrow – intentionally so. He took to heart the lesson 
that the Supreme Court taught years ago when the Marshall Court decided 
the Hudson and Goodwin case,35 that it is not the province of the federal 
courts to decide what is and is not a crime; it is the province of Congress 
to do that. As a result, as Professor Barkow said, he read statutes strictly, 
not always the way that the Justice Department would have liked. In fact, 
there are a variety of different cases that may have never gotten his vote 
if he had been on the Court when those cases were decided – and by that, 
I’m thinking in particular of the Turkette36 case dealing with the RICO 
Act.  
There are a variety of different decisions he handed down in the 
substantive criminal law area. Now, federal jurisdiction is pretty narrow 
in this regard, and every crime will be a statutory crime, so Professor 
Barkow has talked about how he read statutes. I’m not going to address 
that part because that’s already been covered, but what I want to talk about 
is his use of the common law.  
 
 35. 11 U.S. 32 (1812). 
           36.  United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (ruling that the term “enterprise” includes an 
association-in-fact organized for criminal purposes). 
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He relied on the common law very heavily in a variety of different 
cases. For example, in Schad v. Arizona,37 he wrote a concurring opinion 
dealing with the issue of whether you could have multiple bases for a 
conviction, or whether the jury had to be unanimous on only one of them. 
For example, did the defendant murder the victim, or did the victim die in 
the course of a felony? That, for him, was a pretty easy one, since what 
you are getting at really didn’t matter much, but he also said that in 
common law it didn’t make a difference which basis the jury convicted 
on, as long as they were unanimous about the underlying offense, and the 
common law, for him, was dispositive in that.  
In McCormick v. United States,38 rather than get into an esoteric 
discussion about the relationship between the criminal law and the 
political process, he relied on the common law and used that as a way of 
trying to limit the problem that resulted when you tried to apply an old 
statute that sounded like a common-law statute to contemporary political 
processes.  
In Montana v. Egelhoff, he relied heavily on common law in order to 
address the question of whether drunkenness is a defense to a crime.39 The 
common law had rejected it. At the common law, drunkenness was 
immoral and an offense in and of itself, so the idea that drunkenness could 
serve as a defense to a crime was alien to Blackstone and the others. For 
Justice Scalia, that was dispositive. The Constitution didn’t require that 
what had been permitted or commanded throughout history be done 
entirely differently. So, for him, there was no entitlement to a drunkenness 
defense, even as to a specific-intent crime.  
He followed the same sort of approach in Smith v. United States,40 
which dealt with the withdrawal from a conspiracy, and Sekhar v. United 
States,41 which dealt with the definition, again, of extortion. In fact, to 
some extent, the best example of what Professor Barkow talked about 
with his reliance on the statute is his decision in a case called Brogan v. 
United States,42 which dealt with the so-called “exculpatory no” doctrine 
that had been developed under false-statement cases. If a suspect said he 
was innocent to a police officer, the police officer in the prosecution 
couldn’t charge him with lying to a federal official. Justice Scalia 
absolutely flatly refused to create a new common-law exception to the 
federal False Statements Act because there was no similar exception in 
common law, and more importantly, he saw it as not being his 
 
 37. 501 U.S. 624 (1991). 
 38. 500 U.S. 257 (1991). 
           39.   518 U.S. 37 (1996). 
 40. 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
 41. 570 U.S. 729 (2013). 
 42. 522 U.S. 398 (1998). 
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responsibility to create federal common law in this regard, even when, in 
this case, it would have helped the defendant.  
But there is one case that I want to talk a little bit about where he relied 
heavily on the common law. My colleague, Professor Bibas, was mildly 
critical of Justice Scalia for his decisions in some cases, but there was one 
case that he just got flat wrong. It’s a case called Griffin v. United States.43 
It dealt with the problem of jury instructions that permitted multiple 
potential bases for a conviction where you know one of them on appeal is 
clearly wrong.  He relied very heavily on the common law in rejecting 
Griffin’s argument for a unanimous Court. I have to confess, that the 
indecision in this regard required it be resolved in favor of the defendant 
with the conviction reversed. 
The problem with relying on the common law in this instance is at 
common law there were no appeals. There were no appeals in federal 
criminal cases for capital defendants until 1889, and none for defendants 
generally until 1891, so the common law really doesn’t help you very 
much. In fact, the Supreme Court had addressed this problem under the 
Constitution in a case called Stromberg v. California,44 where the 
question was whether a defendant who is possibly convicted of one of 
several bases that may be unconstitutional is entitled to have his 
conviction reversed. Stromberg and a series of subsequent cases decided 
that where one of the possible bases of the conviction may violate the 
Constitution, the conviction can’t stand.  
He distinguished that case on the ground the error was constitutional in 
nature.  But to me, it really raises the question of why that would make a 
difference. The problem in cases like Stromberg and Griffin is 
uncertainty. You don’t know for certain that the jury relied on a 
permissible ground when it was convicting the defendant. Now, in Schad, 
if all the different bases are permissible, you may not be worried about 
the jury coming to unanimity on any one of them, but if you know for 
certain that one or more of them perhaps is invalid, it’s odd to say that 
we’re going to presume the jury relied on the one that was valid.  
So, common law for Justice Scalia was very helpful because it provided 
a good starting point on interpreting any statute. He made that clear in a 
case called Sekhar v. United States, where he said, “It is a settled principle 
of interpretation that, absent other indication, ‘Congress intends to 
incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms.’”45 It 
provided not only a good basis; it provided a very strong one where that 
was a possible outcome in the case, where you have terms like “extortion” 
and the like used in statutes that had a common-law meaning. He found 
 
 43. 502 U.S. 46 (1991). 
 44. 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
 45. Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729, 732 (2013). 
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that to be extraordinarily powerful. It ranked right up there with the text 
of the statute itself.  
He also found that the common law provided an objective, moral 
judgment that had to be respected. In cases involving – for example, 
Montana v. Egelhoff46 – the question whether a certain defense was 
entitled to be raised by a defendant, he looked to the common law to see 
how England and America had historically treated this defense, rather 
than engaging in the type of cost/benefit analysis or plus/minus analysis 
that you see in a lot of other cases. He believed that if the common law 
had consistently rejected a certain point, it would be unreasonable to 
conclude that the Constitution somehow required that the Court today 
eschew hundreds of years of precedent.  
But, as I mentioned with respect to Griffin, even Homer nodded. 
Unfortunately, sometimes the common law can be very seductive. The 
analysis that relies on what has happened over hundreds of years may not 
always, as Professor Bibas said, be useful today. He relied on it very 
heavily in whatever case he could because he believed judges should not 
be making the law themselves – not just simply the substantive law but 
other law of the type that we heard about in connection with the Fourth 
Amendment, as well as the Sixth Amendment and elsewhere. For that, he 
deserves enormous amounts of credit. He actually brought the text of the 
Constitution and the text of statutes back into play as being the principle 
issue in these cases.  
Judges historically had learned the common-law method – they started 
it at Harvard – and they moved from one case to another in a sort of color-
matching approach. For a variety of cases, he just completely rejected that 
analysis. Where there was a constitutional provision at issue, that’s what 
you had to consider. Where there was a statute at issue, that’s what you 
had to consider. And where the common law provided an answer that may 
have existed for centuries, that is what you had to consider, too, because, 
in each of those cases, you are relying on something other than the judge 
just engaging in a type of balancing that you might see in a tort case but 
that he thought was impermissible under the Constitution and in the 
substantive criminal law. Thank you. 
 
JUSTICE STRAS (MODERATOR): Thank you, Mr. Larkin. Because one of 
the most interesting parts of these panels is the give and take between the 
various panelists, I thought I would give a very brief period, so that we 
can get to questions, for panelists to respond to any points made by any 
of the other panelists. So, in a brief two minutes, do any of you (and it’s 
certainly not mandatory) want to respond to the points made by your co-
 
 46. 518 U.S. 37 (1996). 
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panelists? 
 
PROFESSOR KERR: I’ll bite at one issue, in response to Paul. I’m more 
sympathetic to my colleague Alan Morrison on the issue of whether 
Justice Scalia was a criminal defendant’s best friend. In a lot of ways, he 
was a swing vote in criminal law cases more than a reliable vote for 
defendants. Maybe the way of thinking about it – at least how I think 
about it – is that he was much more of a friend of criminal defendants than 
you would have expected when he joined the Court. Maybe he’s more of 
a criminal defendant’s friend than other Republican nominees or other 
conservatives.   
I think his record is mixed. In the Fourth Amendment area, where 
Justice Scalia got a lot of attention voting in favor of defendants, part of 
that was an assumption that Justice Scalia must be on the government’s 
side. So when he voted for the defense, it was kind of a surprising thing. 
I think of my friends on the liberal side saying, “Wow, I never expected 
to like Justice Scalia’s opinion. But it’s great!” So, I think some of that 
was the surprise aspect that made people remember those decisions more.  
But I think of him as more someone who in the Fourth Amendment 
context was very much a swing vote in the last, say, ten years of his career, 
rather than a defendant’s best friend. 
 
PROFESSOR BARKOW: Now I want to weigh in, too, just for a minute to 
say, OK, maybe not “best friend” but “really good buddy,” because I think 
the way to think about it is the cases where he ruled for the defendant 
instead of the government, these were big areas. These are the ones that 
Professor Bibas was talking about that are the most monumental criminal 
justice decisions, at least in the past two decades, I think, are these 
Confrontation Clause decisions and the Apprendi line of sentencing 
decisions, which have fundamentally changed the way that criminal 
justice operates in the United States. So, they weren’t just here-and-there 
issues, and I understand that the Fourth Amendment is a little bit different, 
but those were really big. Now, it didn’t mean you always won before him 
as a criminal defendant, but I think it’s important that he was willing to 
stand behind his principles and areas, even when it meant watershed 
change for the way that business-as-usual was operating.  
And in statutory cases, I do not think you had a better friend than 
Justice Scalia if you were a criminal defendant because he was a faithful 
adherent to the text of the statute, and time after time studies have shown 
that no one used the rule of lenity more than Justice Scalia.  
So, as a statutory matter, I think, absolute best friend; in the other 
contexts: super good buddy that you wanted along for the ride. And I do 
think part of that is maybe the unexpected of a more conservative judge, 
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but he was faithful to constitutional principles in a way that you could 
anticipate in advance as a litigant arguing cases. You sort of thought, 
“OK, if I argue this way to Justice Scalia, I have a real chance here. 
There’s a way in which I can do it.” With some of the other justices, it's 
less clear, and I think that goes to the methodological consistency. I'm not 
saying that’s who you would want over Justice Stevens, but I think there 
is a way in which he was really true to his principles in ways that were 
fundamentally important. 
 
JUSTICE STRAS (MODERATOR): All right, I’m going to pop in here 
because this little debate actually anticipated the question I wanted to ask 
the panelists. I think that one of the things that’s interesting about Justice 
Scalia’s jurisprudence is the right/remedy distinction. On rights, I think 
that Professor Barkow makes a great point, which is that he was open to 
– and Professor Bibas makes the same point – changing the right, to 
expanding the right. In the Crawford context perhaps; in the Fourth 
Amendment context as well; Maryland v. King,47 his dissent, in that case, 
is an excellent example of that. But when it came to the remedy, he 
seemed to be a little bit more limited in what he would do for a criminal 
defendant – the exclusionary rule, for example. He was somewhat 
skeptical of the exclusionary rule, to say the least. With respect to the 
good-faith exception, he certainly was a proponent of the good-faith 
exception. When you look to the remedy, he seemed to not necessarily be 
the friend of criminal defendants, so I wonder how we can address that 
dichotomy or that almost-tension between the doctrines. 
 
PROFESSOR BIBAS: Let me just add. I think there’s an issue on the 
remedies (and this goes to the post-originalist problem), which is a bunch 
of the remedies that worked in the colonial era don’t work anymore. We 
have created qualified immunities. We’ve taken tort cases away from 
juries. Tort remedies used to do the work in the Fourth Amendment. They 
don’t anymore, so it’s a real problem. What are you going to do about a 
remedy in that situation? Are you going to leave too much exclusion and 
deterrence? Or are you going to leave it, in essence, unremedied? There 
doesn’t seem to be a clear or neat answer to that problem.  
When it comes to the right, I think it’s easier to latch onto as an 
originalist, textualist matter what the right is, and he was very faithful to 
that, and (I agree) maybe not the best friend, but as a textual matter, take 
the death penalty. I think people over-fixate on the death penalty just 
because it’s high profile. It’s actually a very small number of cases. You 
want to compare it to the broad impact on lots of defendants lower down, 
 
 47. 569 U.S. 435 (2013). 
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but as a textualist matter, the Constitution refers to capital crimes. So he’s 
not the defendant’s best friend there because I don’t think anyone who is 
principled about the text or original meaning of the Constitution could be. 
So, he’s faithful to it, but it’s unfair to say that that is driven by a hostility 
to the right; it’s just that that’s a made-up right, basically. And when it 
comes to remedies, there’s a bigger issue as to what is the second-best 
thing you’re going to inevitably be making up or crafting where you can’t 
stick with the original one. 
 
PROFESSOR KERR: I think the remedy question really is an important 
one. Trying to fit that into Justice Scalia’s views is a little bit tricky. With 
the exclusionary rule, just focusing on the Fourth Amendment issues, you 
can say a plausible reading of the history is that that the exclusionary rule 
was not an understood remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. It’s a 
little bit hard because the Fourth Amendment was so much a response to 
a specific set of cases.  So in trying to figure out what the original public 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment was, you’ve got a couple of data 
points, and then you can construe it in lots of different ways. It’s not 
obvious how you do that. The text of the Fourth Amendment says nothing 
about what the remedy should be. It’s written in the passive voice. “Don’t 
do this. This shall not be done.” 
A case I’ve always struggled with, in trying to fit into Justice Scalia’s 
views, is his decision in Anderson v. Creighton48 in 1987, at the end of 
his first term on the Court. He wrote a very important opinion for the 
Court saying that qualified immunity applies to Fourth Amendment civil 
claims. The plaintiffs, in that case, raised an originalist argument. They 
said there was no qualified immunity at common law. The remedy in a 
direct suit against an officer who violated the Fourth Amendment was 
damages for trespass, so that was what the plaintiffs in Anderson v. 
Creighton claimed.  
Justice Scalia’s response is interesting to read. It’s just two sentences: 
“We have never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity 
can and should be slavishly derived from the often arcane rules of the 
common law.”49 Doing so would entangle ourselves in the “vagaries of 
English and American common law.”50 He was sort of scoffing at the idea 
that the common-law rule was the one to follow. 
 How does that fit with Scalia’s views of the right, which was so much 
based on the idea that you have retain the common law? I've always 
wondered: Did Anderson v. Creighton come out that way because it was 
only Justice Scalia’s first term on the Court? If that had come up after 
 
 48. 483 U.S. 635 (1987). 
 49. Id. at 645. 
 50. Id. at 646. 
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twenty years or twenty-five years, would he have said, “Listen, the 
common-law remedy was trespass, no qualified immunity; therefore, that 
should be the remedy”? Or alternatively, did he take that view because 
the cause of action in Anderson v. Creighton was a Section 1983 action 
rather than a trespass claim? If somebody had alleged common-law 
trespass, would there be qualified immunity under a Justice Scalia 
approach? We don’t know, but I think it’s tricky to fit Scalia’s view of 
qualified immunity in with his views of Fourth Amendment rights. 
 
PROFESSOR BARKOW: I think that’s a great question – just really 
quickly. The one area where I think the tension comes, he really didn’t 
like any area where it was just left up to the judge on their own. I think 
we haven’t talked as much about the Eighth Amendment, but you could 
really make a very strong originalist case that Justice Scalia just had the 
Eighth Amendment wrong and that there’s actually a lot of judging that 
needs to take place with terms like “cruel and unusual,” and there are lots 
of great historical articles by Professor Stinneford and others saying, 
“Sorry, that’s just a tough area where judges have to do that balancing.” 
Justice Scalia did not like that, and I do think, when you have areas where 
there’s a tension between the bright-line reigning judges and then one of 
the other methodologies, those are the tough ones. Did he blink 
sometimes? I think so. I think the Eighth Amendment is one of them 
where the idea of just having judges reevaluate whether a sentence goes 
too far was a scenario that was just too hard to bear. So, as a result, the 
view was, “Well, no, nothing can be disproportionate, unless it was the 
kind of sentence that is drawing in court, something that even at the time 
you couldn’t do; otherwise, anything was OK.” I think that's harder to 
justify under his methodologies, and I think where he got there was 
precisely because this remedy question would be so hard, and the judging 
would be so hard. I think that's, for me at least, the area where I look, and 
I say I don't agree. 
 
PROFESSOR BIBAS: Picking up on that, in Lafler and Frye, it’s the same 
thing. It’s really hard to come up with a remedy for bad counsel and plea 
bargaining. That is part of what is driving him to say, “There can’t be a 
right here because the majority’s remedy is so loosey-goosey.” 
 
MR. LARKIN: I think he probably felt over time the difficulty of trying 
to deal with all of these doctrines that predated him that he had to deal 
with, such as Bivens. I mean, if you look at the text of the Constitution, 
there’s only one provision that has a remedy – it’s the Takings Clause – 
and the remedy is you get just compensation. There isn’t a remedy in the 
Fourth Amendment. Then, the only remedy, I suppose, in the Sixth 
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Amendment would be just reversing the conviction or making sure that 
somebody testifies, et cetera. So, he probably would have been very 
uncomfortable with Bivens, but Bivens was decided before he got there 
and then Harlow51 and the other cases create this doctrine of qualified 
immunity. I mean, I remember him asking me one time, “I’m really 
uncomfortable with this qualified immunity doctrine,” and I said, “Well, 
if you want to rule that all executive-branch officials get absolute 
immunity, we would be happy with that!” I think he just was in the 
position of trying to figure out: “OK, I can't completely return the world 
to where it should be, so I'll just try not to make things worse.” 
 
JUSTICE STRAS (MODERATOR): One more question, and then we can 
start lining up here at the microphone. As a state court judge, Professor 
Bibas pointed out some areas where these questions come up a lot in state 
court: the Confrontation Clause, the right to a jury trial. I don’t know how 
many cases I’ve sat on where those constitutional rights have been at 
issue. Now, Justice Thomas is obviously still on the Court, but Justice 
Scalia wrote a lot of the opinions in these areas. He really was a big part 
of how the doctrine in those areas evolved, so as someone who has to 
apply and does apply these doctrines on a daily or weekly basis, I’m 
wondering what’s next. Are those doctrines going to be scaled back under 
a Court without Justice Scalia? Is there anything that we can tell? Is 
Justice Thomas going to carry on the mantle? Certainly, there have been 
retirements that have affected this so-called “Apprendi Five” and the 
“Crawford Five,” and it’s sort of gone on, but there are a number of 
justices on the Court who are skeptical of both of those lines of doctrine, 
so I’m curious, from the panel: What do you see as the future of those 
areas of the law? 
 
PROFESSOR BIBAS: Hard to know. It’s arguable that the Apprendi line 
had run its course, and that the state sentencing guidelines that were blown 
up are not going to be limited any further, but that the courts were going 
to extend that line to indeterminate or unstructured sentencing. In the 
Crawford line of cases, we’ve got this weird situation where Justices 
Sotomayor and Thomas are swing votes on some of these cases, and there 
are factual distinctions among them.52 Does it matter where the lab report 
was sealed or not? Does it matter whether the assailant had a gun or was 
using his fists? If you know these areas of doctrine, you know that some 
of the distinctions among some of the cases are very fine ones, so I don’t 
think the Court necessarily has to overrule them. But failing to extend 
 
 51. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
          52.   Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 
305 (2009).  
24
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss2/7
2018] JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 767 
them – in possibly analogous but possibly distinguishable cases in the 
future – is quite possible. But now the President says he wants to appoint 
justices in the mold of Justice Scalia; who knows what that means? Does 
it mean originalist and formalist, or tough on crime, or what? A Rehnquist 
conservative is very different from a Scalia conservative, and we frankly 
don’t know what’s coming next. 
 
PROFESSOR BARKOW: I would predict that it will be death by a thousand 
cuts for most of them, honestly. I don’t think that they’ll last. The lasting 
legacy, I think, is the methodological one. I do think that, for the 
foreseeable future, justices are going to be committed to the text and 
starting with the text first. I think they’re going to look at history in a way 
that they didn’t before he was there, and I think those will be lasting 
legacies that will take far longer to chip away from. Having said that 
though, there was a backbone and a set of principles to Justice Scalia that 
he was happy to be a lone dissenter, and he was happy to just stick to his 
guns, even when you had very unsympathetic people. It takes a special 
kind of person to do that, and I would hope that we would see people like 
that on the Court, but I think if you’re just kind of an odds maker, the odds 
of finding another one quite like Justice Scalia are zero, and then finding 
that kind of commitment even in the face of really sympathetic 
government arguments, you’re asking a lot of judges when you ask for 
that. He really was a very special person to be able to see the long view. 
Now we look back at some of his decisions, and we just think, “Oh gosh, 
Morrison v. Olson53 – nailed it!” But think about at the time. He was the 
only guy dissenting, a voice-in-the-wilderness kind of thing, and I do 
think you need a personality type and a set of core principles and a spine 
of steel to keep doing that, and it’s very hard. Everything we know about 
social psychology and group dynamics and everything else suggests that 
that will be very hard to replicate. 
 
PROFESSOR KERR: And building on that, what’s so striking about 
Justice Scalia is not only did he have the methodological commitments, 
but he stuck to his guns. He would press them at oral argument. A lot of 
counsel would incorporate that. Some Supreme Court practitioners had 
too much of a fear of Justice Scalia. This is particularly true with new 
Supreme Court advocates, where they would say, “I’m so worried about 
how Justice Scalia is going to respond, I’m basically going to craft the 
brief in large part in response to him.” Well, he’s only one vote. But 
because he was so strong at oral argument, and he was pressing his 
methodological approaches throughout, he had that outside influence.  It’s 
 
          53.   487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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not clear to me that you will have someone, even someone who has that 
similar methodology and view of the world, that they’ll have that 
influence.  Because they just won’t be as strong of a personality. 
 
MR. LARKIN: On the Sixth Amendment, the Apprendi line of cases, I 
think that probably won’t change, and I think the reason the Court came 
down the way it did was that legislatures were gaming the system. 
McMillan was the first case that came along, and once McMillan seemed 
to approve this, it seemed that legislators thought, “Great. Now all these 
important factors we otherwise would have thought should be treated as 
elements of an offense are now just sentencing factors, and we’ll let the 
judge do it.” So, you could be basically convicted of hitting somebody 
with your fist and wind up sentenced for murder because of the different 
add-ons that happened as a result. I think these are very savvy people up 
there, and they know that if they take their foot off that brake, it’s just 
going to come back, so I don’t think that’s going to come back.  
On the Fourth Amendment, I think, ironically, the Court spent so much 
time over the last twenty years (his time there, as well as elsewhere) trying 
to come up with rules that they are eventually going to create so many 
rules that it is impossible for a police officer to know which of the rules 
to follow and that someday, if they keep going in this direction, they’ll 
get back just to a general reasonableness test. He didn’t seem to like that. 
I know Orin says he didn’t seem to like that, but that was always for me 
one of the oddities of his jurisprudence. I mean, he hated a general 
reasonableness judgment, but this was in a provision of the Constitution. 
He used that precise term, so why have all these rules when it just says 
“be reasonable.” And eventually, we may even wind up getting there.  
 
JUSTICE STRAS (MODERATOR): That’s a fair point. All right. Questions 
– feel free to go to the podium if you have questions. Go ahead. 
 
ATTENDANT: Thank you for this presentation. I’m a former state 
prosecutor. I certainly can relate to what you were saying about how these 
issues that come up in the criminal law, particularly when something is 
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Did the police officer 
have grounds to stop an individual? As you know, it’s so fact-based. 
There are just one or two different facts that could completely change 
whether or not the stop or search or seizure was, in fact, reasonable. So, I 
guess my question is: Is there a method or a particular legal doctrine under 
Justice Scalia’s method of interpreting the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights? Is there a way in which the totality of the circumstances could 
have more of a bright-line rule, or is it just completely impossible under 
his way of interpreting the Constitution? Thank you. 
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PROFESSOR BIBAS: Well, there are some Fourth Amendment issues, for 
instance, in Arizona v. Hicks54 – moving the turntable a few inches equals 
a search. Or look to the curtilage versus open fields distinctions in 
searches. There are some areas where there was a rule, and the rule came 
from common law, so you don’t have to get to the totality of the 
circumstances if you have one of those. Those are areas where I think the 
rule had some sticking power. I’m not sure if you can say Arizona v. Gant 
isn’t an originalist decision; it’s a formalist decision, and you kind of have 
a clear rule that comes out. Again, it comes from his idiosyncratic fifth 
vote, but I leave it to Orin as to whether that has sticking power or not. 
 
PROFESSOR KERR: I don’t see the Court as likely to overturn Gant. I 
think Justice Scalia never had an answer to how you get around the fact-
specific standards like probable cause or reasonable suspicion or general 
reasonableness.  An example of this is Scott v. Harris,55 a case on 
excessive force. Excessive force requires the Justices to say whether the 
use of force was reasonable. Scalia apologetically said we’re going to 
have to “slosh through the fact-bound morass of reasonableness,” in the 
sense of “we have no choice but to do this horrible thing and consider the 
totality of the circumstances because that’s just what we’re left with in 
the nature of the inquiry.” I don’t think he had a way around that except 
to cabin the doctrine with rules where rules were available. What is a 
search comes down to a bright-line rule. “This is a search; this is not a 
search.” But the ultimate question of justifying searches or seizures, they 
were just going to be context where there was no other way around but a 
fact-specific inquiry. 
 
MR. LARKIN: I think it would have been fascinating to have Justice 
Scalia on the Court at the time they decided Terry v. Ohio,56 because I 
think he would have thought there’s no doubt that reaching into 
somebody’s pocket is a search, but I also think he would have thought 
there’s no doubt that stopping somebody to ask questions is not a seizure. 
I think he would have said seizures are taking someone into custody to 
charge them with a crime or taking goods for which, say, tax hasn’t been 
paid or something like that. I mean, if you take a look at the opinion in 
Terry v. Ohio, the entire analysis of whether this is a seizure occurs on 
one page where Earl Warren says, “Well gee, if this isn’t a seizure, then 
police officers can do this for all sorts of reasons we don’t like.” He paid 
no attention to the common-law meaning of “seizure” or anything like 
 
 54. 480 U.S. 321 (1987). 
           55.   550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
 56. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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that; it was purely a consequentialist approach. “We don’t like the 
consequences of not treating this as being governed by the Fourth 
Amendment, so it is.” I think Justice Scalia would have rebelled at that 
notion. I think he would have said that the cities, the states, the federal 
government could all regulate the action of police officers up until the 
point there is a seizure, and stopping somebody in the street isn’t one. But 
he clearly, I think, would have said, “What happens after that? You reach 
into someone’s pockets. That’s definitely a search.” He probably would 
have been somewhat looking both ways, I think, in a case like that. 
 
PROFESSOR BARKOW: But if you wanted to make him gasp, you just had 
to mention “totality of the circumstances” as the test. I remember there 
was one opinion where it was the ol’ T-H-apostrophe, “ol’ totality of the 
circumstances.”57 It was like the key of “Now you’re about to do 
something lawless.” So, I think insofar as you are in that box, that was a 
troubling box. 
 
JUSTICE STRAS (MODERATOR): Let’s go to the next question. 
 
ATTENDANT: My name is Bill Otis. I’m a part-time law professor at 
Georgetown. It was an hour into our discussion before Professor Bibas 
mentioned the death penalty. It seems to me that the portrayal of Justice 
Scalia as a friend of defendants only when he thought the text of the 
Constitution required it is somewhat misleading. In fact, the death penalty 
had no better friend and no more eager proponent on the Supreme Court 
than Justice Scalia, and I would give as the foremost example is his 
concurrence in Kansas v. Marsh,58 which I continue to use when I debate 
the death penalty as the best argument for its textual grounding in the 
Constitution. And the best argument against the dissenting opinion in 
Glossip v. Gross59 of Justices Breyer and Ginsburg that the death penalty 
was unconstitutional, an opinion that I think Justice Scalia said pretty 
clearly could not possibly be squared with the text of the Constitution. I 
also dissent from the view that, apart from remedies – and the death 
penalty can be viewed as a kind of remedy for the worst defendants – in 
the matter of rights, Justice Scalia turned out to be a friend of defendants. 
I recall specifically his dissenting opinion in Dickerson v. United States60 
in which he exposes the Miranda61 decision, which is probably in the 
public mind one of the most important – if not the most important – 
 
           57.   United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 58. 548 U.S. 163 (2006). 
 59. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
 60. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 61. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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decisions in criminal procedure that he exposed Miranda as essentially a 
fabrication of what the Fifth Amendment commands, and pointed out that 
not only the automatic exclusionary rule in Miranda but the warnings 
themselves are nowhere required or even suggested in the Fifth 
Amendment. I would ask, in light of these considerations, whether Justice 
Scalia was indeed the friend of defendants that he had been portrayed so 
far today. 
 
PROFESSOR BARKOW: I think what I would say is you may be a good 
friend without ever going beyond your principles for your friends. I have 
a lot of friends, but I wouldn’t violate my core fundamental principles for 
them. So, at least insofar as I was talking about it, if you had a legal 
argument that had merit, absolutely, he didn’t let what may be a knee-jerk 
impulse towards the facts of the case or where the sympathies lie. But if 
you didn’t have a legal argument – and the examples you gave really 
would not be consistent with Justice Scalia’s methodologies. As Professor 
Bibas pointed out, capital punishment is in the text of the Constitution, 
and the Miranda remedy was created by the Court, so in those areas, those 
aren’t the kinds of context where his methodology would ever allow those 
kinds of things. When I say “friend,” to the extent of what is in the bounds 
of acceptable legal argument, absolutely he would be open minded, and 
if the Constitution gave you a right as a criminal defendant – even if it 
hurt the government, made the government’s case more difficult – 
wherein the particular case you didn’t want it, it didn’t matter – he would 
stick to his constitutional guns. To me, when I think of a judge and what 
it means to be “friendly” or not to an argument, I guess what I’m saying 
is “open-minded,” and I think he truly was that. If the Framers gave a 
robust set of rights in the Sixth Amendment and other contexts, he was all 
in, and he didn’t pull his punches. On the other hand, if there wasn’t a 
textual or historical basis for something, you were out of luck. 
 
PROFESSOR BIBAS: I think I can second both what Professor Barkow 
said and what Mr. Otis said. He’s so quotable, but his dissent in Dickerson 
is brilliant. He criticized Miranda as a   “milestone of judicial 
overreaching” and the Court’s reaffirmation of it as “the very Cheops’ 
Pyramid (or perhaps the Sphinx would be a better analogue) of judicial 
arrogance.”62 He was willing to call out when the judges were making 
things up, but when the Constitution actually took him there, that’s where 
he went. So I think you're both right. 
 
JUSTICE STRAS (MODERATOR): All right, next question. 
 
 62. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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ATTENDANT: I’m Paul Kamenar, a Washington attorney. I was going 
to ask about Dickerson. I sat second chair with Professor Paul Cassell 
argued that, and Justice Scalia agreed with us, so since that question has 
been asked, let me ask a different one. Professor Bibas, you talked about 
Justice Scalia’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. How do you think he 
would have ruled in Luis v. United States,63 where he heard the argument 
in November but passed away before it was decided? That case held that 
the pre-seizure of untainted assets of the defendant violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. It was a 5-3 decision, so his vote would not 
have made a difference, but, based on your discussion of his more limited 
role of the Sixth Amendment, how do you think he would have ruled in 
the Luis case? 
 
PROFESSOR BIBAS: I vaguely remember that in Caplin & Drysdale,64 he 
was one of the votes in the five-justice majority that said you could freeze 
a defendant’s assets. So I’m not sure that he necessarily, as an original 
matter absent precedent, would have said that you have a right to 
appointed counsel as opposed to (as it was written in the 18th century) a 
right to retain your own lawyers. He never rejected the precedent that had 
established that, but whether he would have extended it to say that you 
have a right to keep the funds you need to hire your own lawyer, it’s 
dubious that he would have gone the extra step, but I don’t know. 
 
JUSTICE STRAS (MODERATOR): All right, we have a couple of minutes 
left. I’m going to ask the other unanswered, unasked question that I had, 
which goes to Professor Barkow’s presentation, which is one of the things 
I actually find fascinating about Justice Scalia is, in some of his opinions, 
he suggests that the rule of lenity may very well be a first resort and not a 
last resort, and he’s made that point at various points in his career. But, of 
course, the rule of lenity is a pretty heavy finger on the scale of the 
criminal defendant, and I know that Justice Thomas and other 
“conservative members of the Court” have often viewed the rule of lenity 
as a last resort, not as a first resort. My question is: What explains that, 
and are there any principles lying in the background that set Justice Scalia 
apart? Certainly, anyone can answer; it’s just that particular presentation 
sort of brought that question about. 
 
PROFESSOR BARKOW: I see it as consistent with some of his 
administrative law jurisprudence and statutory interpretation there. There 
 
           63.   136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016). 
 64. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989). 
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are two steps under Chevron,65 and Justice Scalia almost never got to step 
two, so he didn’t have to defer to an agency because, under step one, he 
found the statute clear. I think this kind of the mirror image of that where 
he looks at a criminal statute, and if it’s just not clear on its face, then the 
tie goes to the defendant. I think, for some of the other justices, there is 
more of a willingness, certainly, for the justices who use legislative 
history, they’re rarely going to get there. For the justices as committed as 
he was to not using that, they maybe would be a little more likely to get 
there using structure, other textual clues. But I think for him, it was a 
venerable canon, it’s a common-law tradition like no other, so whenever 
he would talk about statutory interpretation canons, the rule of lenity was 
kind of numero uno in terms of what you had in the arsenal both because 
of its historical pedigree but also as a matter of just thinking in a 
government. If you rule for the government and you’re wrong as a court, 
what’s the criminal defendant going to do? March back to Congress and 
say, “You got this wrong! Won’t you rule in favor of criminal 
defendants?” We know as an empirical matter that, in fact, Congress is 
very unlikely to act when defendants lose. In contrast, when the 
government loses, Congress often does fix the statute. I think as both a 
historical matter and just an operation of good government matter, there’s 
a way in which you insist on clarity, and you use lenity to make Congress 
be clear, and I do think he had a lot of those canons. That was basically 
to force Congress to do a better job, and I think that’s another reason for 
him it was easier to rely on lenity because then it’s not that hard for 
Congress to come back and rule against a criminal defendant in our 
system. In our system, for the individual, it’s just hard to get those kinds 
of protections, whereas the government has so much sway. I think for all 
those reasons, it was an easy step for him because I think both as history, 
as commitment to textualism, and at least what he said in Sykes and other 
decisions is it’s just so easy for Congress to make a slap-dash law, but 
there should be more care that’s taken before you take somebody’s liberty 
away. 
 
PROFESSOR KERR: I’ve always seen his focus on the rule of lenity as 
really an outgrowth of his focus on separation of powers. Justice Scalia 
had a strong sense of it: “Listen, there are three branches. They each have 
their role; they can’t get out of their role. The role of the legislature is 
defining what is a crime. If they didn’t define what is a crime, they failed 
at their job and have to go back and do it again.” And the answer of other 
judges would be: “Well, we can fill it in. We can help them along. The 
judges can do a little bit of the legislative role.” And I think Justice 
 
 65. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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Scalia’s strong rule of lenity principle, I’ve always understood it to be 
reflecting this idea that judges shouldn’t don’t help the other branches. 
Each branch has individual roles, and we have to stick with those. So, it’s 
that commitment to the separation of powers driving the rule of lenity.  
And less concern than maybe other justices had about the consequences 
that might follow from that in terms of this one case, instead focusing on 
the need for the legislature to do its job. 
 
PROFESSOR BIBAS: And complementary to that, I would stress notice. 
If you’re a textualist reading the statute, you could plausibly consult with 
an attorney to read this statute, but it’s not likely that you’re going to be 
able to understand legislative history in the way that a court in hindsight 
is eventually going to get it. If you get to it at the last step, after you’ve 
rummaged through a bunch of the materials, it’s really hard to say you’ve 
had clear, fair warning—whereas if you’re just looking at the face of the 
text, it’s at least more plausible. Now again, I suggested that was a fiction 
in part. But it still might be a useful fiction in terms of constraining 
sources and providing some notice, as well as some constraint on 
discretion, because the critique of legislative history is if you have too 
many sources out on the table, the judges or prosecutors pick the sources 
that they like as opposed to all being on the same page quite literally, the 
page of the statutory text. 
 
MR. LARKIN: I think it also reflected possibly a separation-of-powers 
jurisprudence and concerns, but also it was concerns about the role of 
government in liberty. I think there are a lot of justices that would be 
willing to adopt, say, overbroad interpretations of the statute, assuming 
that the government would pick only the really bad actors to prosecute. 
And I think he saw that as being an improper way for the courts to act, 
that liberty was important, and unless a statute clearly said you could be 
deprived of it, the government was not entitled to deprive you of it. They 
could always go back and change it, but unless and until they did, there 
was a presumption in favor of liberty rather than reading it the opposite 
way. 
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